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Diagnosis related groups (DRGs) were originally developed in
the 1970s by researchers at Yale University.1 Their aim was to
define “hospital products” and to measure what hospitals
actually do.2 Medicare in the United States soon realised the
potential of DRGs for paying hospitals for their work and
introduced the first DRG based payment system in 1983. Since
then, DRGs have spread around the world, gradually becoming
the basis for paying hospitals in most industrialised countries,
particularly in Europe.3 Even though hospital doctors in Europe
are salaried rather than paid by DRGs, their clinical decisions
largely determine the income of their hospitals and their
specialist societies can influence the way DRG systems work.
We recently reviewed the experience with DRG systems in 12
European countries,4 and here we compare the different systems
and discuss current trends and the potential for improvement.
Why use diagnosis related groups?
European countries introduced hospital payments based on
DRGs either to increase transparency or to improve efficiency.4
DRGs increase transparency because they condense the
confusingly large number of individual patients treated by
hospitals into a manageable number of clinically meaningful
and economically homogeneous groups (for example, primary
hip replacement in elective patients or transient ischaemic attack
in patients under 70 without complications). By providing a
definition for “hospital products” DRGs enable comparisons
that would otherwise not be possible.5 For example, examining
the proportion of cases in each hospital falling into more costly
DRGs can help showwhether one hospital treats more complex
cases than another. Use of resources can be compared by
assessing whether patients in the same DRGs are staying
significantly longer (or are more costly) in one hospital than in
another. Similarly, quality can be assessed by comparing the
care processes or rate of complications for patients in a particular
DRG.6
DRGs are thought to improve efficiency because they provide
incentives for hospitals to limit the services per patient and to
treat more patients. Previously health systems had used fee for
service or global budgets. Fee for service encourages hospitals
to provide many services for each patient but may result in
unnecessary or inappropriate treatment and a disregard of
treatment costs. By contrast, global budgets contain costs by
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limiting total expenditure but run the risk of hospitals not
producing sufficient services tomeet patient or population needs.
In Europe most countries developed their own DRG systems in
the 1990s (though Portugal started in the early 1980s). Some
developed their systems from scratch (Austria, England, the
Netherlands); others imported a DRG system from abroad and
used it as the starting point for developing their own. Only
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain continue to use imported systems
from the US or Australia. The Nordic countries have created a
common system (see fig A on bmj.com).
Intended and unintended consequences
Because most countries in Europe moved to DRG based
payment from global budgets, their experience differs from that
in the US, where DRG based payments succeeded fee for
service. In the US the introduction of DRG based payments
initially led to a reduction in hospital activity7 8; the effect (as
intended) in Europe was an increase in activity, particularly in
day care.9 10 For example, in England between 2003 and 2007,
day case activity increased by about 15% while total NHS
inpatient activity increased by 10%.While in the USDRG based
payment helped contain costs,7 the increase in activity in Europe
mostly led to higher hospital costs.9 11 For example, in Austria
between 1997 and 2007, total hospital costs increased by 3.8%
annually, while costs per case increased by 1.7%.12 Whether
increased activity and reduced costs per case led to improved
efficiency in European hospitals and whether this was the direct
effect of DRG based payment is difficult to say.
DRG based hospital payment may have unintended
consequences if the effects are too strong.7 13 14 For example,
DRG based payments are intended to reduce length of stay and
cost of treatment, but an excessive reduction in length of stay
may reduce the quality of care. Research in Europe found little
change in death rates and readmissions when DRG based
hospital payments were introduced.15 However, in France 30
day readmission rates after discharge seem to have increased
since the introduction of DRG based payment,16 and a study
from Sweden showed that patient perceived quality of care
decreased.17
Other potential unintended consequences of DRG based hospital
payment include cherry picking, dumping, upcoding,
overtreatment, and frequent readmissions.13 Cherry picking
occurs if certain patients within one group are systematically
more costly than others, leading to incentives for hospitals to
select the less costly, more profitable cases and to transfer or
avoid the unprofitable ones (“dumping”). Upcoding refers to
hospitals increasing their revenue by coding additional diagnoses
to move patients into a higher paying group. Furthermore,
hospitals may even change their practice patterns, providing
procedures that place patients in higher paying groups (such as
treating patients with acute myocardial infarction with drug
eluting stents instead of bare metal stents); or they could admit
or readmit patients to hospital for unnecessary services or for
conditions that could be treated in outpatients (currently few
countries use DRG based payments for outpatient activity and
inpatient treatment may be more profitable).
Our research in Europe suggests that these unintended
consequences are relatively rare—or at least that they have been
detected rarely despite (or because of) regular audits by
monitoring and review bodies. Evidence of cherry picking is
available only for England and France, where private providers
have been found to treat less complex patients than public
hospitals.16 18 Intentional upcoding and overtreatment are
substantial problems in France and Germany (box 1) but seem
to be uncommon elsewhere.13
Several countries have introduced policies to try to prevent
frequent readmissions and overtreatment. For example, in
Germany and England, hospitals are—under certain
conditions—not paid for readmissions within 30 days from the
initial admission or discharge.2 21 Furthermore, to avoid an
excessive increase in the number of admissions, hospitals in
England in 2013 receive only 30% of the full tariff for
emergency admissions that exceed the number of admissions
in the financial year 2008-09.22 Similarly, in Germany, total
hospital activity is limited by negotiated target budgets and
hospitals can keep only 35% of the revenue earned for activity
provided in excess of the budget.
Similar problems, different solutions
Most unintended consequences can be avoided or reduced if
the DRG system uses high quality data on costs and is good at
creating groups of patients that have similar costs and cannot
be easily manipulated.23 If differences between patients within
the same groups are not adequately controlled for, the payment
is either too high or too low for many patients, creating strong
incentives to game the system. In theory, the more groups
created, the more homogenous they will be, but a balance has
to be struck between resource homogeneity and having a
manageable number of groups for comparative and payment
purposes.1 23
Table 1⇓ shows that in most countries the number of groups
has increased considerably in recent years. Between 2005 and
2011 the number of groups in the German system increased by
almost 40%, the number in England more than doubled, and
the number in France more than tripled. By contrast, the number
of groups in the Netherlands, which introduced its first
classification system in 2005, fell from an extremely high
number of about 100 000 groups to about 4000 in the latest
version of the system. Under the previous versions of the system,
identical patients were sometimes put into different groups,
depending on the specialty that treated them. The smaller
number of groups makes it easier to keep the system up to date
and to reliably calculate average costs.
Large differences remain between countries in the number of
groups. Interestingly, countries with a high number of groups
for one condition do not necessarily have a high number for all
conditions. For example, England has two groups for stroke but
14 for hip replacement. In Germany, where patients with stroke
are classified into 10 groups, stroke unit care, systemic
thrombolysis, intracranial haemorrhage, and death, among other
things, are taken into account,24 whereas in 2008 England
distinguished between only cerebral infarction and intracranial
haemorrhage, although stroke unit care has since been
incorporated into the best practice tariff. For acute myocardial
infarction, eight countries differentiate between patients with
and without certain complications and comorbidities (such as
diabetes and heart failure) but three countries (Austria, England,
and the Netherlands) do not.25
The reasons why DRG systems were established in the way
they were—and the reasons for revising them—are rarely made
public, and the processes are not completely objective. Usually,
the process relies on input from medical specialist associations
or expert consultants and the decisions are made by a national
authority. Some have been developed from previous systems
that classified groups of procedures (Austria, England, and
Poland), and the systems in these countries still have a different
grouping logic from that used in other countries. Other
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Upcoding and overtreatment in Germany
In Germany, the regional medical review boards of sickness funds audit hospital bills for coding errors or overtreatment. In 2009, medical
review boards selected 12% of all hospital cases (about two million cases) for audit after initial screening.19 About 40% of audited cases
contained coding errors or overtreatment, mostly unnecessary admissions or excessive length of stay. Some hospitals were found to
systematically overcharge, while bills at other hospitals had few errors.
Examples of upcoding included newborns with a secondary diagnosis of “need for assistance with personal care” (ICD-10:Z74.1), patients
with an asymptomatic urinary tract infection coded as acute cystitis, and “miscounting” the number of hours for patients with artificial ventilation
(leading to substantially higher payments). Some hospitals were found to use procedure codes for “geriatric early rehabilitation,” although
they did not have geriatric specialists. Others admitted patients without proper justification for procedures that should, in general, be performed
on a day case basis; and a large number of hospitals were found to discharge patients later than necessary.
Audited hospital bills (including all audited cases) were found to be on average between €730 and €940 higher than justified.
In addition, a recent study found that the birth weight of low birthweight infants in Germany has changed since the introduction of DRG based
hospital payment. Infants now cluster at birth weights just below the cut-offs for lower paying DRGs, whereas previously birth weights were
more evenly distributed.20
differences are due to some national authorities (usually in larger
countries) being more inclined to increase the number of groups
to improve resource homogeneity, while others give a higher
priority to keeping the number of groups manageable. Some
countries have better cost data available for their DRG systems,
making it possible to split patients into more groups. Last but
not least, medical specialists in one country (or in some
specialties) might be more engaged in classifying their work
into homogeneous groups and in pushing for revisions to the
DRG system than those in other countries or specialties.
Usually countries claim that their national system is tailored to
their needs, implying that their DRG system is good at
explaining national practice and resource consumption patterns
while keeping the number of groups manageable. But we could
not identify any relation between differences in clinical practice
and DRG system design. For example, England does not use
comorbidities as a classification variable for patients with acute
myocardial infarction, even though the number of patients with
comorbidities is similar to that in countries that do split for
comorbidity. European treatment guidelines exist for acute
myocardial infarction and stroke,26 27 implying a consensus about
what constitutes good quality and cost effective care; more
uniformity should therefore be possible.
Countries also differ in the relative prices paid for different
groups (figure⇓). For example, in Germany, payments for the
most complex stroke group were 10 times higher than for the
least complex stroke group (price index range 0.25-2.55). In
England, reimbursements for most stroke patients were similar
irrespective of complications and procedures performed (price
index range 0.88-1.00), implying that the system is not good at
distinguishing between complex and less complex patients. For
acute myocardial infarction the price differed almost 13- fold
between the four groups in Estonia, whereas there was a less
than fourfold difference between the 10 groups in Germany.
Quality of DRG systems
We analysed the ability of DRG systems to form cost
homogeneous groups of patients28 using the adjusted (deviance)
R2 as an indicator of the proportion of variation in costs (or
length of stay) explained by the groups. This measure should
be used with caution for comparisons because of differences in
the underlying data. The ability of systems to form homogeneous
groups of patients is not the same for all conditions (table 1⇓).
Finland, France, and Germany do best for acute myocardial
infarction and England does best for hip replacement, suggesting
that countries have the potential to learn from each other.
Other possible measures of DRG systems could include how
resistant the system is to manipulation, how well it is accepted
among the relevant stakeholders, and whether it improves
transparency.
Current trends and potential for
improvement
Three major trends in the development of DRG systems in
Europe are observable. Firstly, countries are trying to integrate
incentives for improving quality into their payment systems
(table 2⇓).23 For example, as with the Commissioning for Quality
and Innovation (CQUIN)29 framework in the UK, DRG based
payments can be adjusted at the hospital level by increasing
payments for all patients if hospital quality indicators show
good quality. Alternatively, payments to a hospital for all
patients falling into one DRG could be increased if the hospital
scores above average on DRG specific quality indicators. For
example, in Germany a pay for quality contract between a large
insurer and a hospital in Karlsruhe awards higher payments for
bypass surgery if in-hospital mortality and post-surgical
mediastinitis is below the German average.
Secondly, because more hospital activity is taking place in day
care and outpatient settings, DRG systems are being extended
to include these areas. Several European countries, such as
England, Germany, and Sweden, are transferring the concept
of DRGs to psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals, following
the example of the US.30 31
Thirdly, there is great interest in the development of bundled
payment systems to better align incentives across multiple
providers, including hospitals and ambulatory care, and to
improve coordination and quality.32However, so far, it remains
difficult to define products (similar to DRGs) for these extended
care bundles.33 Existing definitions, such as episode treatment
groups, which classify patients for entire treatment episodes,
remain too imprecise to be used for determining payment.
One thing is certain: as long as there are hospitals, measuring
hospital activity and using this information for management
and payment purposes will continue to be important. Therefore,
DRGs will remain popular around the world as they are the best
available measure for what hospitals actually do. Episode based
bundled payments are likely to complement DRGs rather than
replace them. It is therefore important that DRG systems in
Europe learn from each other.
This paper is part of an occasional series prepared in conjunction with
the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies (www.
healthobservatory.eu)
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Tables
Table 1| Comparison of diagnosis related groups (DRGs) in European countries for selected episodes of care*
Sweden
Spain
(Catalonia)PolandNetherlandsIrelandGermanyFranceFinlandEstoniaEnglandAustria
Total No of DRGs by year
740670—100 0006658787018314966108832005
97667649030 00066511378008314966109002008
976684522400069811942375102078613899912011
No of cases
34 8177 72181 63431 3416 192202 75869 05412 0073 40973 85716 545
Acutemyocardial
infarction
32 84911 08987 39731 6635 380267 59296 92013 0955 72970 25618 092Stroke
20 2632 90245 31222 9355 231222 261140 31321 7621 73786 09019 363Hip replacement
No of diagnosis related groups†
7667610166476
Acutemyocardial
infarction
2836510105125Stroke
2362391022148Hip replacement
Relative price range for diagnosis related groups‡
0.47-2.810.97-2.641.00-8.840.80-2.150.83-2.031.00-3.690.37-3.320.10-2.790.81-11.050.51-1.380.87-1.92
Acutemyocardial
infarction
1.00-1.450.76-2.440.48-2.100.12-1.170.28-8.410.25-2.550.21-3.010.06-3.801.000.88-1.001.00-2.27Stroke
1.00-1.491.00-1.660.43-2.100.38-1.001.00-2.181.00-1.871.00-2.030.65-1.371.00-2.140.53-1.700.78-2.64Hip replacement
Adjusted
(deviance) R2§
0.420.370.25NA0.180.490.530.50NA0.390.09
Acutemyocardial
infarction
0.160.140.30NA0.400.490.530.260.330.250.14Stroke
0.290.180.39NA0.370.320.370.220.220.500.26Hip replacement
*Definitions are available at: www.eurodrg.eu/EuroDRG_EoCdefinitions.pdf.
†Number of groups into which at least 1% of patients are classified; Figures are for 2008 for all countries except France and Poland, for which 2009 data were
used.
‡See fig 1 for explanation.
§Measure of the ability of a DRG system to explain variation in costs or length of stay. Length of stay data were used for analyses in Austria, Ireland and Poland,
where cost data were unavailable.
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Table 2| Options for integrating quality adjustments into DRG based hospital payment systems and examples from selected European
countries and the United States23
ExamplesMechanism
Type of payment
adjustment/
calculation
Predefined quality results are met or not met—eg, the Commissioning for Quality and
Innovations Framework in England
Payment for entire hospital activity is adjusted
upwards or downwards by a certain percentage
Hospital based
Overall hospital readmission rate is below/above average or below/above agreed target
(for example, in the US)
Hospitals invest in quality improvement programmesHospital receives an additional payment unrelated
to activity
Insurers negotiate with hospitals that DRG payment is higher/lower if certain quality
standards are met/not met. For example, in Germany, a large insurer awards higher
payments to a hospital for bypass surgery if the hospital scores better than the German
average on in-hospital mortality and post-surgical mediastinitis for these patients
Payment for all patients within a certain DRG (or
a disease entity) is adjusted upwards or
downwards by a certain percentage
DRG/disease based
DRG payment for some treatment episodes (such as cholecystectomy, stroke care, or
primary hip replacement) is based on a “best practice” tariff, which could be higher or
lower than national average costs. For example, in England a payment is made for
compliance with all seven best practice criteria for fragility hip fracture in addition to the
base tariff, which can vary depending on the level of trauma, complexity of the procedure,
and presence of complications
DRG payment is not based on average costs but
on costs at hospitals delivering good quality
Readmissions within 30 days after the initial admission are not paid separately but as
part of the original admission (for example, in England and Germany)
No payment is made for a casePatient based
Complications (that is, certain conditions that were not present on admission) cannot be
used to classify patients into DRGs that are weighted more heavily (for example, in the
US)
Payment for an individual patient is adjusted
upwards or downwards
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Figure
Number of DRGs and relative price range for three episodes of care in 11 countries. The length of the bars indicates the
range of the price index, which compares country specific DRG weights (relative weights, tariffs, or scores) with the weight
of an index DRG (price index = 1) for the episode of care (that into which a standard case without complications would be
classified).25 The size of the circles represents the number of DRGs used to classify patients
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